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It may appear all too obvious that the extent to which foreign direct investment (FDI) is 
attracted by bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and regional trade agreements (RTAs) 
depends on the strength of key investment provisions. Still, BITs and RTAs have typically 
been treated as black boxes in prior empirical literature, ignoring two important legal 
innovations: investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) and pre-establishment national treatment 
(NT) provisions.1 
 
An assessment of the impact of different classes of BITs and RTAs on bilateral FDI flows 
between up to 28 home and 83 developing host countries (covering the period 1978-20042) 
yields strong evidence that liberal admission rules promote bilateral FDI. For instance, a host 
country could increase its share in total FDI flows by almost 30% in the hypothetical case of 
switching from RTAs without pre-establishment NT provisions to RTAs with such provisions 
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 Recent efforts to code BITs and RTAs help overcome this gap. Jason Yackee classified BITs according to 
ISDS provisions. (Jason Yackee, “Do BITs really work? Revisiting the empirical link between investment 
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in relation to all possible partner countries. In conducting our analysis, we used a wide range 
of control variables, employed different estimation methods to test the robustness of our 
findings, and also found that the results are not due to reverse causality. Like other similar 
studies, however, our model did not given data limitations or account for unilateral changes in 
the admission of FDI. Compared to NT provisions, ISDS mechanisms appear to play a minor 
role. 
 
Also in contrast to what one might expect, the impact of similar investment provisions on 
bilateral FDI depends on whether these provisions are contained in RTAs or BITs. RTAs 
offering nothing specific to foreign investors, in terms of liberal admission or effective 
dispute settlement, leave bilateral FDI unaffected or may even induce a substitution of home-
country exports for FDI. By comparison, foreign investors respond to BITs rather 
indiscriminately regardless of the strength of dispute settlement or market access provisions. 
This may be surprising given that some recent BITs are no longer restricted to investor 
protection and extend to FDI liberalization. The low profile and rather technical nature of BIT 
negotiations provide a possible explanation; foreign investors may tend to regard BITs as 
agreements containing a similar set of rules, without checking their legal intricacy. Clearly, 
further qualitative studies are needed better to understand how investors take into account 
BITs and RTAs when making investment decisions.3 
 
Our findings suggest that governments seeking to attract FDI may put greater emphasis on 
providing comprehensive and transparent admission guarantees. It is primarily the market 
access guarantees provided by NT at the pre-establishment phase that appears to lead to more 
FDI. NT provisions using negative list modalities improve legal security and predictability at 
the admission phase. Specifically, signalling effects appear strongest if pre-establishment 
NTprovisions cover all sectors, precisely list non-conforming measures and generally bind 
access conditions at the currently level of openness. More restrictive approaches of limiting 
NT provisions to selected sectors do not appear to be effective.  
 
Concerns the choice between BITs and RTAs, policymakers seeking to attract FDI may face a 
dilemma. The negotiation and ratification of RTAs tend to be highly politicized. This may 
help alert foreign investors and increase FDI. However, rule setting in RTAs typically covers 
a much wider area than in BITs and could impose additional costs. Policymakers should know 
that RTAs tend to be ineffective in promoting FDI if the focus is exclusively on trade 
liberalization. On the other hand, the technical nature of BIT negotiations may have the effect 
that foreign investors are hardly aware of more favourable features that BITs may contain. 
Investment promotion agencies bear major responsibility to convince foreign investors that it 
is worthwhile checking the small print of BITs. 
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